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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
KENNETH WHITMORE, a Minor by and
through his Guardian ad Litem, SAM 0.
WHITMORE,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, CALAVO GROWERS OF CALIFORNIA, MELVIN J. ROMNEY and EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF WAUSAU, a
corporation,
Defendants.

12730

KENNETH WHITMORE, a Minor by and
through his Guardian ad Litem, SAM 0.
WHITMORE and SAM 0. WHITMORE,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No.

12367

CALAVO GROWERS OF CALIFORNIA, a
corporation, and MELVIN J. ROMNEY,
Defendants and Respondents.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a consolidated appeal from a dismissal of
appellant's action in the district court and a subsequent
denial of benefits by the Industrial Commission of Utah.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
AND BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Kenneth Whitmore sustained a permanent injury to
his elbow on June 2, 1967, when he slipped or fell from
a pickup truck owned and operated by Melvin J. Romney,
An action was filed in the District Court of Salt Lake
County on October 16, 1968 against Romney. On October
16, 1970, an amended Complaint named Calavo Growers
of California an additional party defendant - plaintiff
alleging to have been an employee of Calavo Growers of
California or Romney.
The district court dismissed the Amended Complaint
.with prejudice as to both defendants holding that Work·
men's Compensation is an exclusive remedy against an
employer. An application for benefits was denied by the
Industrial Commission based on failure of petitioner to
file within the statute of limitations.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants and Respondents, Calavo Growers of
California and Employers Insurance of Wausau, submit
that both inferior tribunals should be sustained and the
respective decisions affirmed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Calavo Growers of California and Employers Insur·
ance of Wausau, hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Calavo", essentially agree with the statement of facts
as set forth in appellants' brief, with certain aspects re·
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quiring additional clarification. Calavo maintained a resident agent in Utah, Mr. Melvin J. Romney. Calavo maintained workmen's compensation coverage with Employers
Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin during the period October 1, 1966 through October 1, 1967
(R. 12367, p. 53).
On October 16, 1970, an Amended Complaint was
filed in the District Court of Salt Lake County, naming
Calavo an additional party defendant, Romney having
b2en named the sole defendant in the original action filed
exactly two years earlier. Counsel for Calavo verified the
existence of workmen's compensation insurance coverage
on the date of the accident in question, and moved to
dismiss plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 35-1-60, workmen's compensation being an exclusive remedy for an employee against
his employer. Melvin J. Romney joined in the Motion
to Dismiss, and both motions were granted by the district
court. Petitioner then filed an application with the Industrial Commission of Utah, naming Calavo Growers of
California, Melvin J. Romney, Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin as defendants. This
application was filed with the Industrial Commission on
December 23, 1970 (R. 12730, p. 2). Defendants then
moved to dismiss the application pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Sec. 35-1-99, as having been filed more than
three years from the date of the accident or the date of
the last payment of compensation. After an extensive
hearing and review of briefs filed by both parties, the
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Hearing Examiner, and subsequently the Industrial Com.
mission sitting as a whole, denied the application on the
limitations argument. After denial of a Motion for Review, both the Industrial Commission case and the cJis.
trict court dismissal were consolidated on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PETITIONERS' ALLEGATIONS THAT THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR PRESENTING CLAIMS TO THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION IS TOLLED DURING INFANCY, CANNOT BE SUSTAINED PROCEDURALLY OR SUBSTANTIVELY.
If there is one rule to which this Court addresses
itself more than any other, it may be that well established
principle, or perhaps admonition, that parties shall not
be allowed the utilization of this forum to argue a point
of law in the first instance. Petitioner now seeks approval
of a contravention of this rule by claiming for the first
time on appeal that the limitations statute of the work·
'men's compensation code should be tolled during the in·
fancy of the workman. This Court has repeatedly held
that issues not raised in the inferior court cannot be heard
for the first time on appeal. Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d
366, 482 P. 2d 702 (1971); Estate of Ekker, 19 Utah 2d
414, 432 P. 2d 45 (1967). Writ of Review from the In·
dustrial Commission are equally bound by this rule of
practice. Utah Delaware Mining Co. v. Industrial Com·
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mission, 76 Utah 187, 289 Pac. 94 (1930); Spring Canyon
Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 608, 201 Pac.
173 (1921). Petitioner would have this Court abandon
a time-honored and well-founded precedent and allow
arguments on a newly raised issue on the basis of dicta
found in Stanley v. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 228,
8 P. 2d 770 (1932), to the effect that if some tenable
theory was raised by competent evidence and the Commission refused to consider it, that the matter could be
remanded by the Supreme Court for findings in light
thereof. Under the facts and circumstances of the Stanley
decision, this dicta was appropriate; however, it should
be noted that this Court failed to find the requisite necessity to remand in Stanley and affirmed the Order of the
Commission.
There is not the slightest suggestion in any pleadings
filed with the Commission, nor in any arguments presented before the Hearing Examiner, or in post-hearing
briefs, that petitioner questioned the efficacy of the statute of limitations as set forth in Utah Code Annotated,
Section 35-1-99, as applied to a fourteen year old applicant. It is only after the Hearing Examiner and the Commission, sitting as a whole, determined the application to
have been untimely filed that the suggestion is made that
the fact of infancy alone should toll the running of the
limitations period.
Petitioner's counsel can be commended on his ingenuity in presenting everything possible to allow his
client to prevail, but to condone this transparent and
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readily admitted attempt to abrogate a basic procedural
touchstone would be to fly in the face of pronouncements
issued by this Court from its earliest day and which have
been the basic foundation of appellate practice before it.
Defendants submit that this issue cannot and should
not be here considered due to petitioner's failure to raise
it with the Commission. Ogden City Corp. v. Industrial
Commission, 92 Utah 423, 69 P. 2d 261 (1937), wherein
at 92 Utah 430, Mr. Justice Moffat held:
this court may not go beyond the record in a review on certiorari and new issues not found in the
record may not, for the first time, be made in this
Court.
Calavo would further submit that this issue cannot
be sustained on a substantive basis. The Kansas Supreme
Court has considered an identical question and in Johnson v. Snyder Chemical Co., 178 Kan. 580, 290 P. 2d 1010
(1955), that court held the Workmen's Compensation
Act to be a creature of the legislature which has determined who is effected by the act, the conditions under
which compensation is to be paid injured workmen or his
dependents, and what notice of claim must be given and
when. The Kansas statute was silent as to tolling in
minority and the Kansas court held that a claim on behalf of an injured minor workman was barred by not having been filed within the statutory period.
It should be here noted that Whitmore had the assistance of very able and competent counsel to assist him
in filing his claim for relief arising from the accident of
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June 2, 1967. Counsel was actively involved in representing applicant for at least twenty (20) months prior
to the expiration of the statutory limitations period. He
now contends that infancy alone is sufficient to toll the
statute; this is contrary to the basic intent of the workmen's compensation statute as being applicable to all
workmen, minors or otherwise. This Court has held in
Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Wash Laundry, 108 Utah 1, 156
P. 2d 885 (1945), that minors are "employees" within
the definition of that term as now found in Utah Code
Annotated, Sec. 35-1-43 (2). Thus, as minors are employees and required to follow the dictates and rules and regulations of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the limitations provision applies to minors as to all other employees.
Calavo reiterates its position as taken in the Industrial
Commission, that no employee-employer relationship existed between Kenneth Whitmore and Calavo. Even if
this Court should find the relationship to have existed,
the limitations statute would apply against Whitmore and
the Order of the Industrial Commission must be affirmed.
POINT II.
THE HEARING EXAMINER CORRECTLY
FOUND THAT THE MEDICAL PAYMENT
BY STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY WAS NOT MADE
ON BEHALF OF CALAVO GROWERS AND,
THEREFORE, NO NEW LIMITATIONS
PERIOD BEGAN WITH SUCH PAYMENT.
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The Hearing Examiner conducted a thorough investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the
accident of June 2, 1967 and of the medical payment<;
which were paid to Kenneth Whitmore by Melvin J. Romney's personal automobile insurance carrier, State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, hereinafter referred to as "State Farm". The record reflects that State
Farm assumed responsibility for damages sustained by
applicant and entered into active negotiations toward
settling the claim (R. 12730, pp. 56-57) .
Mr. Romney testified that State Farm was acting in
the sole capacity of his automobile liability insurance carrier and that no such payments by State Farm were made
on behalf of Calavo Growers (R. 12730, p. 53). This Court
has held on numerous occasions that in reviewing a compensation case, it will examine evidence only to ascertain
whether there is any substantial evidence in support of
the findings of the Commission and whether the Com·
mission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
The Hearing Examiner made specific Findings of Fact
as follows:
Subsequent to the accident, Romney's personal
automobile insurance carrier, State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, negotiated settlement for Mr. Whitmore's injuries and paid certain
medical benefits. At no time since the accident on
June 2 has Calavo Growers of California, or any
representative of Calavo Growers, p:nd any
amounts applicant by way of compensation. The
payments made by State Farm Mutual Automo·
bile Insurance Company were not made on behalf
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of Calavo Growers. (Emphasis added.) (R. 12730,
132-133.)
As the Hearing Examiner made a specific finding that
the payments made by State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company were not made on behalf of Calavo
Growers, it is wonderous the manner in which applicant
now attempts to ignore the finding in its entirety. Again
counsel's ingenuity can be admired, but no such "slight
of hand" should be permitted before this Court to allow
payments made by State Farm to become "compensation" as defined in Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-144 (6): "the payments and benefits provided for in this
title" and thus magically become payments on behalf of
Calavo. The Industrial Commission has made a specific
finding and as the finding is supported by competent evidence, this Court must affirm. Kelly v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 73, 12 P. 2d 1112 (1932); Parker v. Industrial Commission, 78 Utah 509, 5 P. 2d 573 (1931) ;
Hauser v. Industrial Commission, 77 Utah 419, 296 Pac.
780 (1931).
Calavo would submit that no payments of compensation were ever made by it to applicant. The Hearing Examiner, as the sole judge of credibility of the witnesses,
resolved a disputed issue of fact in favor of Calavo. This
Court should sustain such specific finding. No evidence,
however slight, was adduced on behalf of applicant showing that State Farm was a compensation carrier for Calavo
Growers. It follows, as night the day, that no payments
on behalf of State Farm may be attributed to Calavo, and
therefore no new limitations period commenced.

'
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POINT III.
THERE WAS NO CONDUCT ON THE PART
OF CALAVO GROWERS WHICH WOULD
ESTOP FROM ASSERTING THE THREE
YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The Hearing Examiner made a specific Finding of
Fact regarding appellant's claim that Calavo should be
estopped from asserting the limitations provision of Utah
Code Annotated, Sec. 35-1-99:
The above application was filed December 18,

1970, more than three years from the date of the

accident or the date of last payment of compensation, and it is therefore barred as a matter of
law pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 351-99.

The Commission finds no conduct on the part of
Calavo which would estop it from claiming benefits of this limitation provision (R. 12730, p. 133).
Applicant bases his third assignment of error on the
failure of the Industrial Commission to find that Calavo
should be estopped from claiming benefit of the statute
of limitations because: "Petitioner's delay in filing his
claim was attributable to defendant's conduct." (Appel·
!ant's brief, p. 14.) Applicant bases his estoppel argument
on a purported conversation which occurred some two
weeks after the accident wherein Romney is alleged to
have stated that there was no workmen's compensation
benefit available for Kenneth Whitmore (R. 12730, PP·
39-40). Mr. Romney, the then Calavo representative in
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Utah, denied that such conversation took place (R. 12730,
p. 56) . Both Mr. Whitmore and Mr. Romney agree that
Mr. Romney informed the Whitmores that Romney had
available personal automobile liability insurance and that
subsequent to their conversations, State Farm advised
the Whitmores that State Farm would take care of the
medical expenses (R. 12730, p. 39). As heretofore discussed, the Industrial Commission is the sole judge of the
credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the evidence
and the facts, and its decision as to such matters is final
if there is any substantial evidence to sustain it. Chief
Consolidated Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 70
Utah 333, 260 Pac. 271 (1927). See also, Board of Education of Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 83
Utah 256, 27 P. 2d 805 (1933). Calavo will submit that
as the Hearing Examiner has resolved a disputed issue
of fact and is the sole judge of credibility, this judgment
should not be overturned in light of the competent evidence to sustain it.
Should this Court determine that the purported conversation did occur, then it must resolve the issue as to
whether applicant relied thereon, for without reliance
there can be no estoppel as a matter of law. Petitioner
cites two cases dealing with estoppeL The first, Rice v.
Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P. 2d 159
(1969), involved a factual situation where an insurance
adjuster made numerous representations to the claimant
that "his company would take care of everything". Several conversations occurred between the adjuster and the
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claimant during the year following the accident. It was
not until the one year statute of limitations had run that
the adjuster for the first time indicated to the claimant
that her claim was to be denied.
The trial court correctly held that the action by the
insurance adjuster was so gross in inducing plaintiff to
delay filing of her action until after the statute had run
'that to allow the insurance carriers to claim the statute
'of limitations would be inequitable. In Rice, there was
no factual dispute as to the conversations had between
the adjuster and the claimant, either as to content or
extent. It is obvious, therefore, that Rice can be clearly
distinguished from the facts before the Industrial Commission in this case as applicant claims to have relied
solely on an isolated conversation which occurred some
two weeks after the accident.
In Utah Apex Mining Company v. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah 305, 209 P. 2d 571 (1949), the insurance
carrier was again estopped from claiming benefit of limitations statute when it agreed originally to the acquisition
of jurisdiction by the Industrial Commission and subsequently attempted to challenge the jurisdiction. This
Court held that the jurisdiction was continuous and denied any attempt to deny continuing coverage to the ap·
plicant. As Utah Apex was a continuing jurisdiction case,
Calavo fails to see how its rationale or holding can be
applied to the facts and circumstances of the case before
the Court.
The fact that applicant failed to file his claim within
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the three year statute is no fault of Calavo, nor should
Calavo be estopped from asserting this defense. In deciding the issue of estoppel to claim benefit from the statute of limitations in workmen's compensation cases, this
Court in McKee v. Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 550,
206 P. 2d 715 (1949), considered a matter wherein applicant sustained an injury while at work, visited the company doctor, received six days temporary disability and
returned to work. He was eventually laid off and seven
years later returned to work. After returning to work,
he sustained an industrial accident and sought medical
treatment from his personal physician, after which he
requested clearance from the company physician to return
to work. The company physician advised applicant that
he had not been injured in this latest accident, but that
he was unable to return to work due to a muscular spasm
in his back. Applicant received treatment from his personal physician using the company doctor's diagnosis.
Finally, McKee sought and obtained a third physician's
opinion and was informed that he had, in fact, sustained
an injury on the second occasion.
McKee then filed a claim with the Industrial Commission after the expiration of the statutory period, but
contended that he was not barred because the company
doctor had either mistakenly or intentionally informed
him that there had been no injury to his back and that
he had a right to rely and did, in fact, rely on such a diagnosis to his prejudice. This Court framed the issues as
follows at 115 Utah 556:
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Before
can prevail upon a theory of estoppel, it is mcumbent upon him to establish his
reliance upon the company doctor's statement
which we shall assume was erroneous. If the evidence permits a finding by the commission that
plaintiff did not rely on the statement then his
claim of estoppel necessarily fails.
'
The Court held that plaintiff had had an equal opportunity to discover the truth and the fact that he had relied
upon the statement of the company doctor was not sufficient to permit him to assert an estoppel under the
facts and circumstances presented. McKee had relied
upon physicians of his own choosing rather than upon the
statement of the company doctor, and, therefore, had
failed to establish his theory of estoppel.
It is evident that McKee was an identical fact situation as before this Court, except Whitmore contacted
counsel of his own choosing rather than a physician. This
counsel had an opportunity to contact the Commission
to determine whether Calavo had valid workmen's com·
pensation coverage at the time of the accident. He, in
fact, did so as his affidavit avers (R. 12367, p. 70). The
fact that applicant's counsel was unable to confirm coverage does not controvert the fact that coverage did exist.
When counsel for Calavo contacted the Industrial Commission, he was advised such coverage existed and acquired a letter from the Industrial Commission indicating
that workmen's compensation coverage was in full force
and effect for Calavo Growers of California between October 1, 1966 and October 1, 1967 (R. 12367, p. 50).
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Calavo submits that applicant has not shown a reliance
upon the purported statement of Romney regarding the
nonavailability of workmen's compensation coverage as
applicant retained counsel of his own choosing who attempted to verify the issue of coverage. Hence, as there
has been no reliance upon any statement by Romney,
there can be no estoppel against Calavo as a matter of
law.
It is undisputed that applicant did not file his claim
until after the expiration of three years from the date
of the accident or the date of last payment of compensation; the claim having been filed untimely, it is barred.
Fredrickson v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 233,
429 P. 2d 981 (1967); Jones v. Industrial Commission, 17
Utah 2d 28, 404 P. 2d 27 (1965).

POINT IV.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED APPELLANTS' AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE.
On October 16, 1970, appellant filed an Amended
Complaint, naming Calavo Growers as an additional party
defendant and alleging for the first time that Kenneth
Whitmore was in the employ of defendants Calavo Growers of California and Melvin J. Romney, or one of them
(R. 12367, p. 41). As appellant had framed an issue of
the existence of an employee-employer relationship between appellant and respondents, Calavo and Melvin J.
Romney each moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint
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by virtue of Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 35-1-60 which
provides in pertinent part:
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the
provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an
employee, whether resulting in death or not shall
be the exclusive remedy against the
and
shall be the exclusive remedy against any officer,
agent or employee of the employer....
The District Court dismissed the Amended Complaint
with prejudice based solely upon the above-quoted provision.
Calavo is somewhat nonplussed at the argument
raised by appellant that there are material factual issues
in dispute and, therefore, the granting of the motion was
improper. Appellant claimed the existence of an employment relationship and respondents assumed for the pur·
pose of argument that the relationship existed. The statute is clear and unequivocal that no civil liability shall
inure and "no action at law may be maintained against
an employer or against any officer, agent or employee
of the employer based on any accident, injury or death
of an employee."
Calavo submits that the district court was required
to dismiss with prejudice as the Workmen's Compensa·
tion Act affords appellants an exclusive remedy and ap·
pellants must be content to accept the compensation pro·
vided for by the Act. Halling v. Industrial Commission,
71 Utah 112, 263 Pac. 78 (1927). The fact that appellant
claims he is now unable to benefit from Workmen's Com·
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pensation because of an untimely filing of his claim does
not detract from the efficacy of the district court's order.
Calavo submitted the affidavit of the policy clerk of
the Industrial Commission which stated that Calavo had
full workmen's compensation coverage during the period
wherein Kenneth Whitmore was injured. Appellant filed
a counter affidavit stating that his counsel was unable to
verify workmen's compensation maintained by Calavo
when counsel first contacted the Industrial Commission.
Appellant did not and cannot traverse the affidavit of
the policy clerk that workmen's compensation was in full
force and effect on June 2, 1967. There is no genuine
issue of fact as to coverage being available. Therefore,
the granting of respondents' motions to dismiss was proper
as each was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P. 2d 624 (1960).
See also, Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham,
10 Utah 2d 329, 353 P. 2d 168 (1960).
The fact that appellant claims Kenneth Whitmore
may have been the employee of Melvin J. Romney at the
time of the accident does not affect the validity of the
dismissal as to Calavo. Calavo's sole negligence is claimed
to have arisen from the employment relationship and this
relationship, ipso facto, mandates dismissal.
Appellant lastly decries an alleged impropriety by
Calavo denying the existence of the employment relationship in the Industrial Commission hearing after having
allegedly utilized it to have the district court Amended
Complaint dismissed. It should be noted that the In-
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dustrial Commission did not rule on the validity of the
employer-employee relationship and based its dismissal
solely on the fact that the application was filed untimely;
that is, more than three years from the date of the accident or the date of the last payment of compensation.
It would appear, therefore, that plaintiff has not been
injured in any way by the so-called "about face" for which
it complains of Calavo. A similar argument was raised
before the Arizona Supreme Court and was disposed of
in Weaver v. Martori, 69 Ariz. 45, 208 P. 2d 652 (1949),
wherein that court stated at 208 P. 2d 655:
The petitioner urges that the respondent, having
succeeded in procuring a dismissal of the damage
action upon the grounds that the minor was its
employee, now, in the proceedings before the Industrial Commission cannot be heard to say that
the employer-employeee relationship does not ex·
ist. This contention might be well and good were
it not for the fact that the Guardian ad Litem's
Complaint in the civil suit was based on the
allegation that the minor was an employee of the
respondent....
Certainly, the respondent by agreeing with the
plaintiff in the civil suit that the employer-em·
ployee relationship existed did not mislead the
plaintiff as to the facts, nor can it be said that the
latter changed his position prejudicially by reason
thereof.
POINT V.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN
DISMISSING APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT
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AS AGAINST ROMNEY BECAUSE OF ROMNEY'S FAILURE TO PLEAD THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN HIS ANSWER TO THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT.
While it is true that the defendant Romney did not
set forth as an affirmative defense "injury by a fellow
servant" in the Answer to the Amended Complaint, he
did allege that the Complaint failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.
On the 18th of November, 1970, Romney filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis of the amended pleadings
and particularly upon the ground that the pleadings
alleged both the defendants and plaintiffs were fellow
servants and that workmen's compensation was the plaintiff's only remedy. Thereafter, Affidavits and Counter
Affidavits were filed without objection by any of the parties, a copy of the policy providing for workmen's compensation was introduced into evidence as an exhibit and
the depositions of witnesses and parties were published.
The Motion for Dismissal was argued on the 10th of December. At no time did the plaintiff raise the defense or
protest that the affirmative defense of workmen's compensation had been waived by defendant Romney by not
pleading it in the Answer to the Amended Complaint
during the argument of the Motion to Dismiss. Nor did
the plaintiff file or argue any motion that the Motion
to Dismiss should be stricken.
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Under the provisions of Rule 12 (b) it is stated:

"If on a motion asserting the defense num.
bered 6 to dismiss for failure of the pleading to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted
matters outside the pleading are presented to and
not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed
of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be
given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."
Rule 12 ( c) , pertaining to Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings, provides:
"After the pleadings are closed, but within
such time as not to delay the trial, any party may
move for judgment on the pleadings. If on a mo·
tion for judgment on the pleadings, matters out·
side the pleadings are presented to and not ex·
eluded by the court, the motion shall be treated
as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56."
The court did allow the Motion to Dismiss and plain·
tiff, as indicated, did not file a Motion to Strike, nor did
he argue along the lines that the Motion to Dismiss could
not properly be filed. The plaintiff, therefore, waived any
objection he may have had because defendant could have
filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amendment to his
Answer to specifically include the defense of fellow em·
ployee. The motions of the defendants were treated by
the court as a Motion for Summary Judgment in fact
and matters outside the pleadings were presented and not
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excluded by the court. The plaintiff had full opportunity
to raise any defenses which he had to the motion of Mr.
Romney for dismissal, but did not present any argument
pertaining to improper filing of a motion.
Rule 56 pertains to a Motion for Swnmary Judgment
and subparagraph (b) thereof provides that a party
against whom a claim, counterclaim or crossclaim is asserted may at any time move with or without supporting
affidavits for summary judgment in his favor as to all or
any part thereof.
This is in effect what defendant Romney has done
and inasmuch as it is specifically provided for in the rules
set forth above, there was no waiver on the part of Romney at the stage of the proceedings when the motion to
dismiss was granted and in view of the pleadings filed by
the parties at that stage.
Subparagraph (h) of Rule 12 pertaining to Waiver
of Defense states:
"A party waives all defenses and objections
which he does not present either by motion as
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion in his answer or reply, except (1) that the
of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (2) the defense of failure to
join an indispensible party, and (3) the o?jection
of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may
also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings. * * *"
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It is clear, therefore, that the rules do provide for
the procedure that was followed by the defendant Romney and the plaintiff's failure to take any action to have
the defendant Romney's motion to dismiss stricken constituted a waiver on the part of the plaintiff, if in fact
there was anything improper about the filing of such a
motion. The case cited by the plaintiff, to-wit, Thom<l$
v. Braffet's Heirs, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P. 2d 507, (1956), is
not in point in this case, and the court properly granted
the defendant Romney's motion.

CONCLUSION
The District Court properly dismissed Appellants'
Amended Complaint with prejudice based upon work·
men's compensation being the exclusive remedy against
an employer. The Industrial Commission properly denied
applicant's claim as having been filed more than three
years after the date of the accident or the date of last
payment of compensation. Calavo Growers of California
and Melvin J. Romney submit that this Court should
affirm both the District Court and the Industrial Com·
mission.
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